Huling Yakap

Ikaw ang best friend ko. Magkaibigan tayo simula grade one hanggang makapagtapos tayo ng hayskul. Magkaibigang matalik din ang mga lola natin. Pareho tayong naghihikahos sa buhay at salat sa mga materyal na bagay. Close tayo at kilalang kilala natin ang isa’t isa. Kamukha mo ang tatay mong si Tito Efren kaya at ikaw ang kanyang junior. Kumpleto ang inyong pamilya samantalang ako ay ulila na. Para na ring anak ang turing nila sa akin dahil madalas akong matulog sa inyo. Namatay ang aking mga magulang sa isang aksidente noong ako ay apat na taong gulang pa lang. Ang aking mga agwela ang nagpalaki sa akin katulong ang mga kapatid ng aking ina.

Gusting-gusto kong nakikita kang nakangiti dahil lumalabas ang iyong mga biloy sa magkabilang pisngi. Kahawig mo ang nasirang matinee idol na si Rico Yan kapag ikaw ay naka- side view. Moreno ang iyong kulay dahil sa palagi kang nakabilad sa araw. Ikaw kasi ang katulong ni Mang Efren sa mga gawaing-bukid. Ako naman ay maputla dahil laging nasa loob ng bahay at nag-aaral. Wala kang hilig sa pag-aaral dahil naniniwala kang nasa diskarte ng tao ang kanyang pag-unlad. Hindi mo nga tinapos ang hayskul at pinili mo ang magtranaho sa ibang bayan samantalang ako ay lumuwas ng Maynila upang mag-kolehiyo. Magkasalungat nga raw talaga tayo sabi ng ating mga kababaryo.

Kinabahan ako nang gumalaw ka sa iyong higaan. Ayokong makita mo akong gising at nakatitig lamang sa iyong maamong mukha. Napabuntunghininga ako. Isa kang anghel sa paningin, Jhun… Halos lahat ng dalaga sa ating baryo ay may gusto kang maangkin. Kahit ang mga may-asawa nang babae ay humahanga sa iyo. Malalagong kilay, may katangusang ilong, at mapupulang mga hugis-pusong labi. Tunay ngang kaakit-akit ka subalit hindi lang ito ang dahilan kung bakit mahal kita. Malalim ang ating pinagsamahan at batid ko ang kabutihan ng iyong loob. Noong nasa elementarya pa lang tayo ay lagi mo akong ipinagtatanggol sa mga nanunuksong kaklase natin. Hindi lingid sa baryo natin ang pagiging bading ko. Bata pa lang ako ay alam ko nang kakaiba ako sa ibang mga batang lalaki. Ngunit hindi naging madali ang pagladlad ko sa aking kapa. Napakakonserbatibo at relihiyoso ang ating mga kababaryo lalo na ang aking mga agwela. Mas mabuti pa nga ang mga magulang mo dahil hindi malaking isyu sa kanila ang aking pagkatao. Hayskul na ako nang matanggap na ng aking pamilya ang pagiging bading ko dahil nakita naman nilang behave ako. Naniniwala kasi akong ang sekswalidad ay dapat manatiling pribado at kung ibabahagi ay doon lamang sa mga taong malalapit sa iyo.

Humaplos sa aking katawan ang lamig ng aircon. Sa Hotel Sogo tayo tumuloy pagkatapos mapagod sa pamamasyal. Himbing na himbing ka sa iyong pagtulog samantalang ako’y hindi dalawin ng antok. Sariwang-sariwa ang sugat ng aking puso. Ipinagtapat mo kanina na nakabuntis ka at nakatakda na ang inyong kasal sa loob ng anim na linggo. Namanhid ang aking pakiramdam nang marinig ko ang iyong balita. Gusto kong umiyak ngunit walang tumulong luha mula sa aking mga mata. Inimbitahan mo akong dumalo sa inyong kasal dahil ako ang iyong bestman. Kinuha mo rin akong ninong ng iyong magiging anak. Hindi pa rin ako umiimik kaya mariin mo akong tinitigan. Inakbayan mo ako at doon na ako napaluha. Ayoko kasing mawala ka sa akin. Mahal na mahal kita higit pa sa pagiging isang kaibigan. Wala pa ring namumutawi kahit isang kataga sa aking mga labi kaya tuluyan mo na akong niyakap. Napahagulhol ako dahil sa iba’t ibang emosyong bumalot sa akin ng mga panahong iyon. Hindi ito ang ung pagkakataon ng nasaktan mo ako. Iniwan mo ako noon, ni hindi ka man lang nagpasabi kung saang lupalop ka pumunta. Tapos ngayon ay bigla kang babalik at ipapangalandakan mong magkakaroon ka na ng sarili mong pamilya?

“Alam kong mahal mo ako, Lei. Mahal din naman kita, eh. Ikaw ang bespren ko. Malalim na ang ating pinagsamahan. Wala namang magbabago sa pagkakaibigan natin. Nauunawaan mo naman ako, ‘di ba. Maging masaya ka sana para sa akin.”

Ilang sandaling katahimikan ang dumaan sa pagitan natin. Piping saksi sa atin ang apat na sulok ng hotel. Mataman lang akong nakikinig sa mga sinasabi mo habang tumataas-baba ang aking balikat. Wala nang luhang umaagos sa aking mukha pero nahirapan akong huminga. Hangos mong kinuha ang isang basong tubig sa maliit na mesa sa gild ng kama at ipinainom sa akin. Para akong robot na ibinuka ang bibig habang pinapainom mo ako. Kumalma naman kahit kaunti ang pakiramdam ko. pagkatapos ay inihiga mo ako sa malambot na kama at kinumutan. Tumabi ka sa aking pagkakahiga at niyakap mo ako hanggang sa tuluyan akong kumalma. Maya-maya ay sinulyapan kita at nakita kong nakapikit na ang mga mapupungay mong mata. Nakonsensiya ako kasi halatang napagod ka sa biyahe at sa ginawa nating pamamasyal. Pinakiramdaman kita at nang masiguro kong tulog ka na ay umupo ako sa tabi mo.

Tama ka, Jhun… Malalim na ang ating pinagsamahan. Mahal na mahal rin kita simula pa noong mga bata pa tayo. Nauunawaan kita. Ang totoo, pinaghandaan ko na ang mangyayaring ito na magkakaroon ka rin ng sariling pamilya. Hindi ko nga lang inaasahan na mangyayari kaagad ito dahil wala ka namang nababanggit sa akin tungkol dito. Tatlong taon tayong hindi nagkita. Hindi ka man lang nagparamdam maging sa iyong pamilya. Ang huli nating pagkikita ay noong pumunta kayo ng nanay mo sa bahay namin sa Maynila. Marami akong tanong na naghahanap ng kasagutan. Subalit ayokong guluhin pa ang isip mo. Alam kong naguguluhan ka rin sa mga nangyari sa buhay mo. Gaya ngayon. Pinikot ka lang ng babae pero bakit pumayag ka kaagad na maging mag-asawa kayo? Dahil ba sa magiging anak ninyo? Masakit ngunit kailangan kong tanggapin. Ganyan kita kamahal. Ang pag-ibig ay hindi makasarili bagkus ay mapagbigay at maunawain.

Marahil ay narinig mo ang bulong ng aking puso dahil marahang dumilat ang iyong mga mata. Kumunot ang iyong noo at hinila mo ang aking kamay upang lumapit sa iyo. Naramdaman ko ang tigas ng iyong palad bunga ng araw-araw na pagtatrabaho mo sa bukid. Kusa akong sumunod at nahiga sa tabi mo. Iniunat mo ang iyong kanang braso upang maging unan ko. Bigla mo akong niyakap na ikinagulat ko naman. Mahigpit ang iyong pagyapos at kinabig mo ang aking katawan para ipatong sa iyo. Parang matutunaw ang puso ko nang mga sandaling iyon kaya gumanti na rin ako ng yakap. Ito na marahil ang huling yakap na matatanggap ko sa iyo. Hinaplos mo ang aking buhok ng iyong kanang kamay habang ang kaliwa naman ay nasa likod ko. Hindi ko na naman napigilan ang lumuha sa ligayang bumabalot sa aking puso. Isinubsob ko ang aking mukha sa matipuno mong balikat. Kung ito man ang huling pagkakataon para makasama kita nang matagal, gusto kong ipadama sa iyo kung gaano kita kamahal. Gumapang ang aking mga kamay – sa buhok, mukha, leeg… hita… Ilang sandali pa at pareho na tayong nilamon ng antok…

Maikling Kuwento: Maging ang Langit ay Lumuha

Lumalagaslas ang malamig na tubig mula sa shower at agad iyong dumampi sa mainit na katawang nakatutok doon. Agad na nagtama ang tubig at katawan at ang init ay napawi. Ngunit mapapawi ba ang dalamhati sa pusong nangungulila? Masasabi nga nilang ang tubig ay maraming kayang lunasan, ngunit ‘di nito kayang maarok ang pusong naghahanap ng isang bagay na dati ay bahagi nito.

Sampung taon pa lamang si Fernan nang malaman niyang kakaiba ang kanyang pagkatao sa kanyang mga kalaro. Hindi siya nakakakuha ng kagalakan mula sa laro ng kanyang mga kaibigang mga lalaki. Pakiramdam niya sa halip na masiyahan siya ay lalo pa siyang nasasaktan at napapagod. Mas ginugusto pa niyang makisali sa mga laro ng mga babae. Masayang-masaya siya kapag naglalaro siya ng mga manika, lutu-lutuan, bahay-bahayan at Chinese garter. Doon niya rin natuklasan ang kakaiba niyang pagkatao. Na isa rin siyang babae – tulad ng mga kalaro niya – pero nakakulong sa isang katawan ng lalaki.

Lumaon ang mga araw at ang mga araw ay lumipas sa taon. Ganap nang sumibol ang pagkatao ni Fernan. Pilit siyang binabago ng kaniyang ama, na siya na lang niyang kasama sa buhay mula nang mamatay ang kanyang ina sa panganganak sa kaniya. Ngunit lahat ng pagsisikap ng kanyang ama na siya’y mabago ay napunta lamang sa wala. Sumuko na lamang ang kanyang ama isang araw at tinanggap na kahit naman “ganoon” si Fernan ay anak niya pa rin naman ito.

Nakaranas ring umibig at ibign si Fernan. Ngunit dala ng kanyang pagiging “ganoon”, hindi rin nagtagal ang kanyang mga pakikipagrelasyon. Doon nga lamang kaya sa kama liligaya si Fernan? Na oo nga at mainit at mapusok ang kanyang kapiling sa kama ng mga panahong iyon, maaari ring sa isang ihip ng hangin ay mawala ito. Sapagkat hindi naman siya tunay na babae at wala siyang tunay na butas ng kaligayahan. Wala rin siyang kakayahang magbunga ng supling na siyang pinapangarap ng maraming lalaki.

Kakaiba si Redentor sa lahat ng kanyang minahal. Bago lamang sa buhay niya si Red. Nakilala niya ito sa isang party. Para kay Fernan, iyong unang sulyap niya sa lalaki ay alam niya nang magkakasundo sila. Kakaiba ang kuryente nang sila ay magkatinginan at mas lalo pang kuryente ang sumambulat nang sila ay magkakilanlan nang pormal.

Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay nang gabing iyon at mula sa party, dumiretso sila sa isang pribadong lugar upang mas pasabugin ang higit na kuryenteng manggagaling sa kanilang mainit na katawan.

Doon sa pribadong silid na iyon natikman ni Fernan ang sarap ng sariwang hamog. Nalasap niya rin ang kakaibang sensasyon nang siya ay pasukin at mistula siyang babae sa bawat labas-masok na iyon ng lalaking kapiling.

Ngunit hindi doon natapos ang kanilang relasyon. Matapos ang makasaysayang gabing iyon para sa kanila ay hindi na rin sila mapagwalay. Noong una’y sa bahay muna nina Fernan nakatira ang dalawa, ngunit dala ng pagkakonserbatibo ng ama nito ay napilitan silang lumipat at magsarili. Sa pagsasarili nila, mas lalo nilang nakilala ang kanilang mga sarili.

Hindi sapat ang kinikita ni Fernan bilang isang kawani sa opisina. At ang dating nakagarahe sa bahay na si Red ay napilitan na ring makibaka sa tunay na mundo upang pareho silang makaraos. Una’y pumasok bilang service crew itong si Red ngunit nang mapansin ni Fernan na nilalandi ng manager na bading ang kanyang karelasyon ay pinatigil na lamang niya ito sa trabaho.

Alam naman nating ang relasyon ay hindi isang kama lang ng rosas. Siyempre’y may tinik din sa bawat daan at may balakid sa bawat paraiso. Nagkaproblema ang dalawa, parikular doon sa kanilang pantustos sa pang-araw-araw na pangangailangan.

Nauwi sa away at sakitan ng damdamin ang mga problemang pilit silang inilulubog. Ngunit dala ng init ng kanilang pagmamahalan ay agad rin naman nilang naresolba ang lahat. At ang bawat pagbabati na iyon ay nasusundan ng mainit na pagtatalik.

Lumaon at sumuko ang katawan ni Red sa matinding pagsubok ng buhay. Naratay ito sa karamdamang hindi malunasan ng anumang gamot. Muli, lumapit si Fernan sa kanyang ama upang humingi ng tulong pero ayaw siyang sagipin nito. Ipinamukha nito sa anak na kung ganoon ang pinili niyang buhay, magdusa siya sa ganoon.

Lumala nang lumala ang karamdaman ni Red at dahil sa bugbog na nga ang mortal na katawan ng binata’y sumuko na ito sa hirap ng mundo.

Malakas ang ulan sa siyudad ng gabing iyon. Marahang tumatangis si Fernan sa pagkawala ng minamahal at parang nakikiramay din ang masamang panahon sa kanyang pagdadalamhati. Mahal na mahal niya si Red at minahal din siya nito. Masuwerte siya dahil kakaunti lamang ang taong nakakatagpo ng tunay na pagmamahal. Subalit naroon ang lungkot sa kanyang puso dahil mahirap pakawalan ang pagmamahal na katulad ng kay Red. Sa huli, babaunin niya sa kanyang alaala ang masasayang araw nila ng binata. Bukas ay panibagong hamon na naman ngunit pagkatapos ng ulan ay sisikat din ang araw.

Minalabac: Physical and Biophysical Resources

LOCATION

The Municipality of Minalabac is located in the island of Luzon, in the Bicol Peninsula. It is one of the thirty-five (35) municipalities in the Province of Camarines Sur and one of the ten (10) municipalities in the First District. There are four congressional districts in the province.

This is more than 400 kilometers by bus from Metro Manila. This can be reached by plane, deplaning at more proximate airport, the Naga Airport, situated at the Municipality of Pili, by traveling partly through Naga City and Municipality of Milaor.

The geographic location of the Municipality of Minalabac is between latitude 123o 8o to 123o to 16` longitude 13o 35` to 13o 24`. Its latitudinal locations are 123o 8` and 123o and 12`. Proximately it is in the west central part of the province.

The Municipality of Minalabac is 7 kilometers away from Naga City with a total land area of 14,506.2602 hectares. It is merely 2.75 percent of the total land area of Camarines Sur.

The distinctive boundaries of Minalabac are: on the north by the Municipality of Milaor, on the southeast by the Municipality of Bula, northeast by the Municipality of Pili, southwest by the wide span of the seawater of Ragay Gulf and on the northwest of the Municipality of San Fernando.

The municipality has twenty-five (25) barangays and seventeen (17) of those or 68% are included in the subproject proposed implementation areas. These are: Bagolatao, Bagongbong, Baliuag Nuevo, Baliuag Viejo, Hamoraon, Hobo, Irayang Solong, Magadap, Malitbog, Manapao, Mataoroc, Sagrada Familia, Salingogon, San Antonio, San Jose, Tariric and Timbang.


WEATHER DATA

Climate Type

The type of climate in the whole Municipality is tropical and it is directly influenced by the existence of the mountains, valleys and flat areas. Based on the climatic classification, Minalabac is included in the second type. The position of the islands, plus the air current that affects the area defines its climatic condition.

The air systems produce distinctive variations in the climate together with topography. These air streams are the northeast monsoon which prevails from October to March and brings significant amount of rainfall, the southwest monsoon which affects the area during the southern hemisphere winter from May to October and causes the warm and humid air with increasing rate of rainfall, and the trade winds which prevails during April and May and raises the temperature significantly.

The mean monthly temperature at Pili, Camarines Station ranges from 20.3°C in January to 23.7°C. The relative humidity is generally high and fluctuates very slightly throughout the year.


Meteorological Data

Rainfall (Hydrology)

The average annual rainfall is 1,271.80 millimeters or a monthly average rainfall of 21.196 millimeters in 60 months period.

There is an annual average rainy days of 98.4 and a monthly average of 8.2 days in 60 months period. An annual average maximum rainfall of 454 millimeters or a monthly maximum rainfall of 37.833 millimeters.

The highest recorded rainfall of 434 millimeters (ml) was in month of November, 2004. The least recorded rainfall is 1 ml, recorded in January 2003. The highest number of rainy days was recorded on October 2001, with 20 rainy days.


Wind Speed

The municipality has no pronounced wind speed such as gustiness to strong ones. Strong or gusty winds occur during typhoons or typhoons hitting the area. Mild winds happen regularly.

Further, the Philippine Atsmospherictronomical Geo-Pphysical Astronomical and Scienceervices Administration (PAGASA) Pili Station, recorded and observed an average wind speed ranging from minimum of 1.8 m/sec to a maximum 95.3 m/sec.


Temperature

The area, classified as type 2 climate, has pronounced cold and hot temperatures. Hot temperatures are more felt during summer session. This is extended and more heightened, if the El Niño phenomenon occurs. La Nina provides pronounced and heavy downpour or rains, beyond its normal occurrences. Cold temperatures normally extend to the month of February, due to the Siberian frostiness reaching the country.

The mean monthly temperature, as recorded in Pili station ranges from 20.3°C in January to 23.7°C. The mean annual temperature is 22.2°C with the average maximum temperature of 23.2°C and the average minimum temperature is 21.5°C.


LAND FORM

The Municipality has a unique land form characteristics. The upland and coastal barangays are straddled on the part of the Cordillera mountain ranges. The structure or geology of the area is with an average top soil of 15 centimeters thick; then the sub-structure is of calcareous clastics weathered to light clayey to light brown sandy soil. The clayey layer ranges in thickness from 45 to 75 centimeters. The light brown sandy soil measures about 0.6 meters to 2.20 meters. **

Going through the mountain and coastal areas, the top soil is ideal for rice farming. The sub-strata are more of clay soil composition and not suitable for high rise buildings. This area is susceptible to liquefaction.*** The meandering part of the Bicol River flows through this area. There are barangays, which land forms are consistent with soil structure to silt soil. These clusters of habitation are uniquely called Riverside Barangays. On the Area Development aspect, this is one of the lower part of the Bicol basin starts.

Across the Bicol River are generally the plain areas. The sub-structure is more stable than clayey. Basically, the lower sub-strata of the area are part of the foot of the dormant Mt. Isarog.


Subproject areas in particular, and the Municipality as a whole have this compendiums of unique features and characteristics.

__________
** Based on Antipolo Resettlement Study, MGB- DENR V, February 2005
*** Ground Settlement Susceptibility Map, Naga City Quadrangle, Map on Development of Mitigation Scheme to Geological Hazards Project, sponsored by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and ENR Shell Programme, DENR V study


Land Form Type

The Municipality has these unique land forms: plain, coastal, mountain, and riverside areas.

Plain areas constitute 9 barangays or 36% of the total number of barangays, this municipality. Coastal areas comprise by 4 barangays or 16%. Mountain areas have 3 barangays out of 25 or 12%. Riverside areas cover 9 barangays or 36%. See Table 1.1.3.21

The general characteristics of the municipality have distinct features. It has a mountain range. This is part of the Cordillera mountain ranges, which stretches up to North Luzon. This has the potential as water source. Data from the National Irrigation Administration - National Resources Water Council (NIA –NRWC) at this area has the potential of 20,000 liters per second ground water mining yield (GWM).

The plain area of the place is substantial, but is inundated by flood waters, during the La Nina of rainy seasons. This is further aggravated by flood waters, pouring in from, as far as the province of Albay.

This is 3.0 meters above the mean sea level (MSL) (NAMRIA map no. 3660 IV).

The Municipality is traversed by the meandering Bicol River that becomes an outflow of flood waters in the Basin Area, into San Miguel Bay.

Further, the land form of the municipality was altered by the construction of diversion channel for flood waters. This is part of a project of the defunct Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (BRBDPO). In terms of regional development, this area is classified as Area Development V.


WATER RESOURCES

Bodies of Water

The municipality has natural and artificial bodies of water. The scope and extent of these water bodies are indicated herein.

Bicol River, measuring approximately 17.25 kilometers, is one of the natural bodies of water that cuts through the Municipality. Cut – off Channel Number 4, which is 3.75 kilometers, is a man-made structure. This is a flood mitigating structure that reaches down to the Municipality of Milaor

Ragay Gulf, in the northwest, situates four barangays of the municipality in its fringes.

Municipal wide, there are seven (7) springs in various locations and one (1) sea which cover 4 barangays. There are also thirteen (13) creeks in the area within 18 barangays. However, some are still in good condition while others are in various stages of environmental degradation.


Water Use

1. Domestic

The forest lands of 891.4753 hectares (Table 1.1.8.2) and the mountain part of Minalabac; are part of cordillera mountain ranges. This has been identified as part of the aquifers in the area. Minalabac is part of the sub-area 1 covering 761 square kilometers. This produces a safe yield (SY) of 9,000 liters per second (lps) of water. The ground water mining yield (GWM) is 20,000 liters per second. Withdrawal discharge is density (WDD) is 25.60 liters per second.+

A plan for the institutionalization of Level III Water System inis being undertaken, by phase approach, by the Municipality and the Representative of the First District of Camarines Sur, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

_________
+ Source: Groundwater Availability Map, National Water Resources Council –
National Irrigation Administration, (NWRB-NIA); Manila, Philippines


2. Irrigation

The Municipality has substantial sources of water for irrigation of the farmlands in the SPA. Aside from the direct assistance given by the Department of Agriculture, Regional Office No. V. These assistance are 461 shallow tube wells, which form part of the over-all provisions for irrigation, See Table 1.4.32. Farmers would drill wells for irrigation, around the SPA area.

Due to funding or project prioritization concerns, the National Irrigation Administration, to this date, has shelved a technically and economically viable project called the Sibagat Small Reservoir Irrigation Project (SRIP) .). This project should have provided irrigation for 262 hectares of arable land within 2 SPA barangaysthe two SPA’s of San Jose and Magadap; fish culture and Level III water source.


3. Navigation

Bicol River is used for riverside transportation. Gulf water is used for alternative travel activities of the coastal barangays to reach other coastal barangays within the Ragay Gulf area.

The frequency of trips – both passenger and cargo, along the river ways and sea lanes are detailed in Table 1.2.4.3.a&b. (Transportation and Costs to Town Market Matrices).


4. Recreation

Water as a means of recreation, i.e. swimming, snorkeling is present. Presence of school of dolphins can be seen along the four coastal barangays the whole year round. The frequency of this dolphin show increases during summer time. A tourism plan is being formulated for implementation, as a sequel to the InfRES Subproject Proposal.

Moreover, the Bicol River and the Ragay Gulf areas are used for religious activities during festivities, called fluvial processions


GEOLOGY

The geology of the Municipality could not be provided with set of boundaries or defined area of coverage. The prehistoric rock and land formation studies were conducted and by the large extent, the Municipality lies above these geologic formation; and that of the island of Luzon.

Technically, the municipality in general, and the SPA in particular, sits on top the spread of these geologic formations.

“An assemblage of Miocene-Pleistone marine and terrestrial sediments, reef limestones and terrance gravel are well-exposed both the western and eastern part of the province. These rocks are uncorformably overlain by recent alluvial deposits. The geologic structure of Camarines Sur, are rather complex. Main structural features consist of thrust faults, vertical transcurrent and broad faults.

These metamorphic rocks are believed to be part of the basement rocks of the Philippines, which unconformably underlie the young litnologic units, which ages range from definitely Cretaceous to Guatemary.

An indifferent ultramafic complex, composed of serpentinized periodotite, pyroxenite and dunite, is found in thrust contact with basement rocks and the Cretaceous Sedimentary sequence. *

_______________
* DENR V, Situation Report, Province of Camarines Sur, 1991


Presence of Natural Hazards

As there are no detailed data available on a per barangay basis, the information is culled from a study conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office V.

This was sponsored jointly by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the ENR Shell Programme (ENRSP). The study is about the Development of Mitigation Scheme for Geological Hazard Map (DMSGHM). The reference map used was National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), 3660 IV.

The flooding hazard, regularly to frequently and seasonally to rarely, affects the riverside Barangays and also, those barangays with slopes 3 – 8%. In the study, these areas are susceptible to ground subsidence due to karst. lLiquefaction for the municipality is likely to happen in flood prone areas.

There is no recorded occurrence of Tsunami in the coastal areas of this municipality; nor in the areas surrounding the Ragay Gulf Bay. The geography of the surrounding area of Ragay Gulf, places the area into an almost zero tsunami incidence. Coastal subsidence, will only occur, if massive tectonic based earthquake will occur, seriously damaging the identified fault line in the Libmanan area. This will cause further damage, with shifting of the continental crack at Barangay Bagolatao.

Minalabac, as part of the island of Luzon has no pronounced fault line. Earthquake occurrence is seldom, and if it does, earthquake is of tectonic origin.

Technically, there are no recorded major landslides which have caused damage to lives or properties. There is an absence to low susceptibility of landslide to barangays located north to northeast of the Municipality, referenced from the part of the Cordillera Mountain range. The barangays in south to southwest of the municipality have moderate to high susceptibility of landslides. The high risk landslide susceptibility is focused in the mountain barangays.

There is no active volcano in the area, though Minalabac, as part of the island of Luzon, is within the pacific ring of fire.

______________
Source: Landslide Hazard Susceptibility Map, Development of Mitigation
Scheme for Geological Hazard Map (DMSGHM), DENR V


LAND/SOILS

The Municipality has three (3) major soil types. First is Bigaa Clay which is widespread in the Municipality. It occupies an area of 8,010.3711 hectares or 55.22% of the total land area of the municipality. Second is Minalabac Clay which covers an area of 6,350.8365 hectares or 43.78%. Third is Taculod Clay which comprises an area of 145.0526 hectares or 1 % of the municipality’s total land area.

The soil type of the municipality has the ph value that ranges from 5.8 lower range to 7.6 higher range. It must be noted that the higher elevated areas, has Ph value range 7.0 and above. The lower to plain areas, has soil fertility reading of 5.8 to 6.6. See Table 1.1.7b.


LAND USE

Regulatory Classification

Minalabac is 147,506.2602 hectares or 0.05% of the total land area of the Philippines, which is 30,000,000.00 hectares. It is 0.82% of the regional land area, comprising of 1,763,250.00 hectares. The Municipality is 2.75% of the 526,680.00 hectares of the total land area of Camarines Sur.

The classified land areas of the Municipality of Minalabac are categorized as follows: alienable and disposable, unclassified, timberland, communal forest and disputed. However, there is no official declaration and/or identification for the location and area in hectares on a per barangay basis.

The municipality has the total land area of 14,506.2602 hectares and 77.89 percent or 11,299 hectares of it is alienable and disposable land; 9.06 percent or 1,314 hectares fall under unclassified land; 8.55 percent or 1,240 hectares comprise the Timberland; 0.51 percent or 74 hectares consist of communal forest and 3.99 percent or 579.26 hectares constitute the disputed land.

There are no ancestral or tribal lands in the area, nor a natural park.


Land Use

The Comprehensive Land Use Plan of the Municipality is yet to be updated and upgraded. However, based on the updated records from the Municipal Assessor’s Office, as consolidated by the Planning Office, agricultural coverage, consisting of rice land-irrigated and non-irrigated; upland and crop has an area of 13,010.53 hectares. Forest area is 1,050.9813 hectares. Residential area is about 73.8768 hectares. Commercial is 0.5081 hectares. The Institutional sector-government occupied areas, educational and religious, covers a land area of 132 hectares. Road, bridges, canals, Small Water Impounding Projects (SWIP), Communal Irrigation Systems (CIS), NPC-ROWS have total area coverage of 53.761 hectares. Others/Unclassified/Unaccounted for area is 184.6030. There is zero area coverage in Industrial Sector.


Strategic Agriculture and Fishery Development Zones

The Strategic Agriculture and Fishery Development Zones (SAFDZ) were formulated jointly by the Municipal Agriculture and Municipal Planning Offices. A legislative action, through Resolution No. 153, Series of 1999. ^See Appendix …
12.12.3.

The Municipal Agriculture Office has indicated its various little milestones in the agricultural and fishery development strategic zones. See SAFDZ table.

In the strategic crop development zone, the targeted 1,250 hectares was attained. Only 21.3% or 20 hectares out of 94 hectares was reached in the diversified rice based development. 63.2 % or 12 hectares out of the 19 hectares for vegetable and root crop development were pursued. 5 hectares of the 20 hectares were reached on fruit tree based development. No accomplishment was indicated in Industrial/plantation neither in the coconut/pineapple development zone of 9 hectares. In the concern of coconut farming, this year, the Municipality in a proposed tie-up with the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) will establish a nursery to propagate high yielding varieties of coco trees. This start-up activity will strive to trigger development in this sector.

The Strategic Livestock Development has zero values in terms of target areas. The target areas are herd management and large animal production.

What is in existence is the native chicken production in the coastal area. Incubation of eggs is now at level of 200 to 250. This is the off-shot of the Municipal Fisheries and Agriculture Resources Management Council (MFARMC). This activity aims, as one alternative, to temporary relieve the seas, as the only food source; and further mitigate slow degradation of the marine and reef areas.

Duck raising and salted egg production is also present in the area this is in Irayang Solong, an InfRES Area. Goat raising is also in the area. A focused approach in terms of methodologies, technical and technological proficiencies must be applied. This activity is to be replicated in the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction – Sustainable Livelihood Project for the Poor in Southern Philippines (JFPR-SLPPSP), a complementary activity to the Infra project of InfRES.

There is prevalence of hog growing and dispersal in the area. A strategy employed by municipal and barangay governments, which is mainly a backyard activity.

The Strategic Fisheries Development Zone, particularly in the creation of a fish sanctuary, came into a legislated reality and in existence. This was by Resolution No. 34, Series of 1998, with Ordinance No. 69, Series of 1998. This has provided spawning area and protected the marine life. At this moment, aquarium fishes are abundant in the area. This is now being planned as part of eco-tourism activities. Inland Fishery has not met its targets.

Conclusively stating, there were minimal developmental changes in the attained targets than the prescribed objectives. Minalabac SAFDZ has to be redefined in terms of realities on funds acquisition, disposition and livestock and crops to be propagated.

Minalabac SAFDZ has to be redefined to meet the needs and realities of the situation, in terms of commitment, fund acquisition and disposition; and the type of crop or livestock to be propagated.

Making Money With Your Website

Google's very simple search engine interface, as compared to its closest rivals, has generated the highest internet traffic in the fast few years. Seeing the potential for paid listings as internet users log on a search term, Google offers its Adwords pay-per-click advertising program that has become very successful since the advertiser only pays when their ad is clicked. Adwords gave birth to Adsense, the webmaster's income generating dream. adsense allows web owners, called "publisher," to display on their site some relevant ads from Google's network of Adword advertisers. Google then pays the publisher for every clicked ad, giving the web site owner an opportunity to make money. More site visitors who click an ad mean more revenue for the web site owner. With Adwords and Adsense, hundreds of thousands of ordinary web owners get a share of Google's profits. Today, bloggers who are able to generate a large number of visitors to their blog sites have been receiving nice checks every month out of Google's success.

GETTING STARTED

Getting Google Adsense onto your web site is easy. You just need to sign up for free at http://www.google.com/adsense. You will wait for a few hours before your site will be approved then Google will provide you with some codes that you need to place on your website. You will have a wide range of options to make Adsense seamlessly blend to the design of your website.

Create and build website that is designed for your visitors and not just merely a site to host Adsense program. Google is serious in shutting down their services on websites with irrelevant or duplicated content. A complete guideline for webmasters who would want to get Google Adsense is found at www.google.com/webmasters/guidelines.html.

Making money with Google on your website has great potentials but it will take serious efforts on your part. Make use of your talent and creativity to produce a website with quality and style that will entice visitors, who will bring money to the bank, to go to your site regularly.

From Protest to Participation: Accountability Reform and Civil Society in the Philippines - Part 1

It is widely accepted that curbing corruption and other forms of particularistic behavior is one of the most daunting challenges of the Philippines in its pursuit of more democratic governance. The country’s inability to create an accountability regime composed of legitimate, empowered, and operative institutions, processes, and mechanisms have resulted to a major deficit that could have dire implications for its democratic quality. To a certain extent, any attempt to enforce accountability and uphold public ethics in the country’s fledgling democratic polity have met with stringent resistance both at the elite and mass levels. This was displayed when the impeachment of then president Joseph Estrada on charges of cronyism and corruption was aborted thereby opening the floodgates of the mobilization of public protest, more known as the 2001 “People Power” Revolt.

There are two conclusions that could be drawn in that very contentious political episode. On the one hand, it has put the issues of accountability and public ethics to the fore. Moreover, it also demonstrated yet again the awesome power of the country’s civil society – a robust sphere of social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civic associations, and people’s organizations (POs) – in demanding accountability from the state (See Arugay 2004).

In the literature, there is an increasing recognition of the role of the civil society in fostering accountability especially in developing countries (Fox 2000; Pope 1996). For example, there has been an emerging interest in studying the roles of civil society in Latin American countries using the concept of “social accountability”. According to its proponents, it rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizen’s associations and movements and also the media in monitoring the actions of public officials, exposing governmental wrongdoing, and the activation of state agencies (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2005: 9). This article asserts that there is substantial evidence that the role of certain civil society organizations in eliciting accountability is transcending the framework of contention and protest and embracing the more constructive task of contributing to accountability reform. This entails a series of changes and transformations that seek to improve institutions and mechanisms aimed at exacting accountability from the government. In the end, this shift of orientation of civil society towards a more participatory orientation would have a more direct, meaningful, and lasting impact to the crusade against corruption in the Philippines.

This article serves as a snapshot of existing initiatives of civil society and their engagement with relevant accountability agencies in order to improve accountability of both elected and appointed officials. It cannot lay claim to exhaustively map all state-civil society partnerships in combating corruption as it merely employs a purposive sample in order to highlight select areas of accountability reform. Data for this paper were gathered using documentary research, key informant interviews, and other secondary sources.

The first section discusses the treatment of existing scholarship on the role of the civil society in promoting democratic accountability. The second section provides evidence on the weakness of the country’s accountability institutions and correspondingly juxtaposes it to existing studies and indicators of corruption in the Philippines. The third section examines the various civil society initiatives and engagements aimed at improving accountable governance and to examine the dynamics of their participation with government institutions. By way of conclusion, this article generates some lessons and challenges for both state and civil society actors in their effort to institute accountability reform.


Civil Society and Accountability: Insights from Theory and Research
As a much-cherished principle, the idea of accountability has always received significant attention from both scholars and practitioners of democracy. From its beginnings in normative political philosophy to the incorporation of positivist approaches such as rational choice theory, there has been a relentless pursuit on how to ensure that those vested with authority are made accountable for their actions and decisions. As one scholar astutely observed, the “norm of accountability appears to be the most widely practiced of democratic principles. It is more prevalent in the world than freedom of association to compete for governmental office, or popular participation in authoritative decision-making, or the right to dissent from official policies without fear of retaliation” (Sklar 1987: 714).

The field of public administration has also contributed to the contemporary theorizing on accountability, particularly with the discourses on new public management (Behn 1998) and good governance by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (1992; 1994) and the United Nations Development Programme (Newell and Bellour 2002). Accountability is largely interpreted as the construction of a code of conduct and performance and a set of standards to be utilized to assess government performance. They emphasized that accountability being a political principle is the monopoly of the state and its various institutions. Through the separation of powers, the recognition of fundamental rights and the system of check and balances, the modern constitutional state establishes the institutions that could curb any arbitrary exercise of power. For mechanisms of such accountability to function effectively, there is an extreme stress in the creation of a legal system enforced by the agencies of the state.

The extensive focus of the aforesaid scholarship on the role of formal political institutions in generating accountability greatly influenced the notion that the state alone has the primary claim over it. However, this has been more and more challenged with new theories provided by democratization and contentious politics discourses. For example, Schedler recognizes that the current evolution of the concept of accountability permits it with much flexibility. It should no longer be seen as a core of invariable basic characteristics but must be construed as a “radial concept” (1999: 17-18). Therefore, it could no longer be exercised in one way nor could it come from a single source (Borowiak 2004).

Among the debates on accountability, a nascent type that goes beyond elections and other institutions of the state is emergent. The concept of social accountability aims at incorporating the insights from the literature on civil society and the public sphere into the analysis of accountability. It posits that “the working of civic associations, nongovernmental organizations, social movements, and the like add not only new resources to the classic repertoire of electoral and constitutional institutions for controlling government but also can, on occasion, compensate for many of the built-in deficits of those mechanisms” (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2005: 9-10). This is manifested through exposing cases of governmental wrongdoing, activating horizontal agencies of control and monitoring the operation of those agencies, mechanisms of social accountability make a crucial contribution to the enforcement of the rule of law.

Social accountability best captures the developments in democratizing countries and the increasing complexity with regard to engagements between the state and civil society. According to O’ Donnell (2005), the main orientation of this type of accountability is not the satisfaction of material interests. This entails that existing theories of collective action based on rational choice might be limited in explaining the politics of social accountability. To a great extent, it is assumed that civil society actors are not interest groups that exert demands on the state based on expected utility. Like the discourses on new social movements, the demands of societal accountability are usually framed in the language of people’s legitimate rights or claims like human rights violations, environmental degradation, lack of access to justice, and corruption. Moreover, the dynamics of social accountability must be understood in the context of the process of democratization in most countries that have made the transition from authoritarian rule. Given that they are fledgling democracies, institutions that should perform accountability functions found themselves ineffective, ill equipped, severely limited, and captured by partisan interests.

However, the proponents of the concept of societal accountability admitted that initiatives aimed by civil society could have an enduring and meaningful impact towards democratic deepening and consolidation if they are able to translate them into the actual reform of institutions legally mandated to enforce accountability. Fox concurred by arguing that “civil society demands for state accountability matter most when they empower the state’s own mechanisms for checks and balances” (2001: 1). It is in this regard that this paper hopes to contribute to the literature by providing evidence of how certain segments of Philippine civil society goes beyond its contentious or adversarial orientation in exacting political accountability from the state and the adoption of a more participatory and cooperative stance.

Protest Versus Participation: Modes of Philippine Civil Society Engagement
The Philippines has often considered as possessing one of the most vibrant, robust, dynamic, and participatory civil societies in the world (Clarke 2000, Cariño 2002). Several cases has proven its efficacy in providing policy inputs (Magadia 2003), delivering social services, pursuing socioeconomic development, and generating accountability. This becomes increasingly significant if one analyzes the Philippines as a country that possesses a “weak state” (Hutchcroft 1991) that could be overwhelmed by the intensity of demands from civil society. But the more apparent reason for an active civil society is it contemporary origins that could be traced in its pivotal role in the anti-dictatorship campaign during the martial law era. Given this, it was palpable that it would participate in shaping much of the restored democracy” after 1986 (Racelis 2000). As one of the primary actors responsible for the transition from authoritarian rule, they cannot sit back, relax, and leave the task to the government as there remains a plethora of problems, inadequacies, and limitations of the current democratic polity (Velasco 2004). It could be said that civil society have more than adequately contributed its share in advocating for democratic reforms in governance (Wui and Lopez 1998; Caagusan 2005) whether successful or otherwise.

To some extent, one can imagine two interrelated modes of civil society engagement with regard to promoting the country’s democratization agenda (Eaton 2003). On the one hand, there is the protest mode which is what most civil society actors are familiar. The tactics of “expose and oppose” were exemplified in the so-called “parliament of the streets” during the authoritarian period. This comprises activities such as coalition-building, collective mobilization, mass actions, media campaigns, and community organizing, among others. As a mode of (dis)engagement, this is often a weapon of last resort, particularly if normal or available venues have been exhausted or confidence and political trust in the government has evaporated. Moreover, this contentious approach is often utilized when civil society perceives that the democratic gains that it vehemently fought for are being jeopardized by state actors.

This precedent had tremendous repercussions for the nature of civil society that developed in post-Marcos politics. It would not be the last time that groups were able to successfully demand accountability from the state. The anti-Estrada campaign that culminated in the so-called People Power II Revolt is a genuine testament of the efficacy and strength of collective mobilization in the Philippines. The range and intensity of contention spearheaded by the country’s civil society was not witnessed since the struggle against the Marcos regime in the 1980s. Collective action generally aimed at exacting accountability from Estrada was successfully mounted using the framework of resignation, impeachment, and ouster (RIO). In conjunction with other strategies of social accountability in different periods of the campaign, civil society groups were able to expose the President’s political scandals, maintain these issues in the public agenda, acquire media attention and national visibility, activate and exercise oversight over political institutions and legal processes, and invite public support and participation (See Arugay 2004).

On the other hand, there is the participation mode, a relatively more novel component in civil society’s repertoire of engagement with the state. The direct involvement in policy processes has been enshrined in the constitution and other legislation, thereby institutionalize their access to power and democratic space in the country’s political arena. This mode enables them to forge strategic partnerships to “collaborate and cooperate” with the state as well as other sectors in society in the creation of new structures, mechanisms, institutions, and policies that could improve the quality of democratic governance, among others. This requires civil society actors to devote their technical competence, experiences, insights, and skills in order to come up with viable alternatives and lasting solutions to lingering problems of the country. This mode may involve policy advocacy campaigns, the establishment of state-civil society partnerships, and direct consultations with political institutions.

(to be continued)

From Protest to Participation: Accountability Reform and Civil Society in the Philippines - Part 2

The Philippine Accountability Regime: Deficits and Shortcomings
As far as legal provisions and formal institutions are concerned, the country possesses one of the most comprehensive, complex, and sophisticated “national integrity system” (Pope 1996) in the world. The accountability of public officials is well enshrined in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which describes in detail their obligations and the available mechanisms that will check the exercise of their authority. In particular, it provides in detail an impeachment procedure and the creation of an independent ombudsman and a special anti-graft court. This is notwithstanding the offices especially created by the government such as the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for presidential appointees and the Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA) for the military.

While the ombudsman enjoys a broad range of powers enough to make a significant mark in the fight against corruption and abuse of public office, assessments concluded that there leaves much to be desired in terms of its performance. Just like other institutions, it also faces credibility and capacity deficits. The latter is palpable if the Philippine ombudsman is compared to Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which has an annual budget that is ten times more than the ombudsman. Moreover, its manpower is also insufficient, since the ratio between a field investigator and a public servant is absurdly at 1:17,000. Despite these difficulties, it is fair to mention that there were some achievements of the ombudsman from 2001-2005. Not only did he lead the reform of the institution, he also was key in increasing the conviction rate of corrupt officials from a deplorable 6% to 20% within his tenure.

The inability of the government to police its own ranks has fed into public opinion and created a widespread perception that corruption is endemic. Indicators coming from both domestic and foreign surveys on the ability of the government to impose accountability have not been that desirable. Existing studies have concluded that the country is poorly ranked on its ability to impose the rule of law and curb corruption. For example, while the general trend of its scores with regard to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), has been improving, Gonzales and Mendoza stated that they have “remained well below the average grade of 5” (2003: 93). The more alarming fact is that the CPI score of the country has been declining for the past three years (2002-2004) placing it as the third most corrupt democracy in Asia (after Bangladesh and Indonesia). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the same international anti-corruption NGO placed former presidents Marcos (2nd) and Estrada (10th) as among the Top 10 Global Corrupt Leaders of all time, the most any country could have. Both former presidents are alleged to have embezzled a combined amount of up to US$10.8 worth of government funds (TI 2004).

Public opinion also revealed that the inability of the government to run after corrupt officials is creating a culture of impunity. In the 1998 and 1999 SWS surveys revealed that as much as 21% of the respondents have been asked for bribes in government transactions. A majority (51%) believed that it was futile to complain while as much as a quarter (25%) either did not know where to report or feared there could retaliation. This perception is also evident in the viewpoint of the country’s business community. Since 2000, SWS has embarked on an annual poll called the Survey of Enterprises on Corruption that seeks to have a sense on the opinions and perceptions of the profit sector. Its fifth survey in 2005 depicted that 66% of the respondents perceived a very high and non-diminishing degree of corruption in the public sector, an almost similar estimate in previous polls. This prevailing belief is substantiated with almost 54% of the enterprise managers asserting that they have knowledge of corrupt business transactions with government. A more startling statistic is that 7 out of 10 of the respondents had a direct experience with corruption (SWS 2005).

To some extent, the country’s weak accountability regime could be linked to its failure to realize its development goals among others. There is an estimate that up to US$48 billion has been lost to corruption over the last two decades, a figure that is nearly equal to the country’s foreign debt. The Commission on Audit (COA), the country’s financial oversight body, has calculated that the annual cost of corruption is around PhP2 billion (US$44.5 million) or up to 20% of the yearly national budget. One could just imagine the how many Filipinos would have benefited from government’s infrastructure projects or social services if that amount of money did not see its way into the pockets of government officials.

Participation in Accountability Reform: Civil Society Initiatives
Just like the 1986 People Power Revolt, civil society came to the fore and undeniably was one of the major forces that led to the ouster of an unaccountable and corrupt leader in 2001. As a stakeholder, civil society was to a great extent responsible for determining the composition of the new political dispensation. Considerably, some leaders of civil society were appointed to significant positions in the new administration. Some formations within the anti-Estrada movement even transformed themselves into parties that successfully won congressional elections. However, much of the mainstream members of the Philippine civil society chose to maintain their distance, remain outside of the formal ambit of the state, and went back to their normal work and respective advocacies.

If there was one crucial lesson that civil society learned from the experience, it is the undeniable fact that the country’s accountability regime could be easily subjected to manipulation and abuse. Thus, a pursuit of its reform became one of the most important components of the post-Estrada governance agenda. Of course, this realization also found its way in the reform package promised by the successor government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The consensus formed by both the state and civil society became a strong impetus for mutual collaboration as both realized that a partnership is needed if the goal of eradicating corruption and increasing transparency and accountability in governance is to be achieved.

This discussion of civil society initiatives will be done by identifying the main civil society actors and their involvement in accountability reform through the following main advocacy themes: (1) awareness raising, (2) government procurement; (3) performance of public institutions; (4) diagnostics; and (5) policy advocacy. This thematic discussion does not preclude the possibility that certain civil society organizations would fulfill more than one of them. However, the objective is to highlight which aggrupations best capture the essence of a particular advocacy.

Awareness Raising: Overcoming Public Apathy and Disaffection
Cognizant that substantial and valid information is the first step in the crusade against corruption, there are civil society initiatives that were focused in providing citizens with education and knowledge on how to demand accountability from government. Doing what they do best – organizing communities – civil society actors were able to equip people with the necessary tools and handles to confront the problem of corruption. It is their hope that the campaign for awareness raising will create “small constituencies for accountability” in their respective localities.

The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) is an exemplar case of an organized grassroots effort empowered to combat corruption at the local level. Composed of a myriad of vigilant citizens – students, professionals, housewives, priests, church workers and government employees – who did not have a common denominator except a sense of outrage and discontent on how government infrastructure projects in their province were fraudulently implemented. CCAGG members used the local media (the diocesan radio, newspapers) and organized community meetings to inform residents about public infrastructure projects. The milestones of this whistleblower included the suspension of government officials who were found guilty of dishonesty and misconduct. Furthermore, their assessment reports were taken seriously so much so that the release of government funds for public projects in Abra required their clearance. As a force for accountability, CCAGG’s efforts were not only known and imitated locally but it has received national and international acclaim as well. It was one the recipients of the first Integrity Awards given by Transparency International. An excerpt of the citation reads:

The pioneering efforts of this organization in fighting corruption at the local level are commendable and clearly demonstrate the capacity of citizens acting collectively to be a powerful force in making governments accountable (TI 2000).

Having technical knowledge and broad experience on this matter, CCAGG embarked on a participatory audit of the local government of Abra in 2002. With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and COA, it aimed to assess “the impact of the audited government program/project to determine whether the program/project achieved its desired results”. This experimental exercise was declared a success by the government and the lessons “were later incorporated into a manual on the Conduct of Participatory Audit published by COA” (Ramkumar and Krafchik 2005: 17).

More than the above-mentioned achievements, the CCAGG model demonstrated the awesome potential of community organization and local popular empowerment for accountability. In particular, people that participated in this organization believed that effective collective action could promote transparency and uncover the “impenetrable secrecy” about government projects (Sumangil 2004).

Another initiative that is related to the objective of overcoming public apathy towards corruption and eschewing impunity for officials who have mastered escaping or “surviving accountability” is the Ehem! Program launched by the Philippine Province of the Society of Jesus (more known as the Jesuit religious order). This church-led effort seeks to “sensitize” the public for them to be vigilant and mindful of one’s moral responsibility in order to combat corruption. A manual was intentionally produced for dissemination through public information seminars and workshops nationwide. It “offers a series of exercises to make people more intensely experience, analyze, and reflect on the gravity of corruption in Philippine society, leading to a deep commitment in combating corruption at the individual, group, and institutional levels” (Alejo et al. 2003).

This particular endeavor is an example of civil society’s advocacy to educate citizens regarding their civic duties, and how they could be a vital component of the solution to corruption. It seeks to enlighten basic citizens and social groups – schools, government offices, parishes, religious organizations, professional associations, business chambers, social development agencies, cause-oriented and political groups, nongovernmental organizations, cooperatives, people’s organizations, and sectoral and community-based movements – regarding the severity of corruption in government and the implications if they are not reported and if perpetrators are not sanctioned. Also, the program aims to link the prevalence of corruption to the degradation of morality and a transgression against the poor. The framework of this endeavor has deep roots in the country’s political culture wherein Filipinos to a great extent have a high threshold for pain and suffering thereby creating a culture of impunity. Added to this is the perception that most of the citizenry has a short memory thereby increasing their tolerance to governmental wrongdoing. The Ehem! Program seeks to painstakingly cause a cultural shift towards graft intolerance and a more vigilant, conscious, and insistent attitude towards corruption and the abuse of authority (Alejo et al. 2003).

The program has recently caught the attention by the government as the OMB and the Jesuits forged a partnership to implement countrywide Ehem! workshops and training seminars in 2003. Being the pilot-tested institution, the OMB has organized several workshops and trainors’ trainings in both its central and regional offices. In the future, the program aspires to conduct similar activities in other parts of the Philippine bureaucracy. In the future, the proponents would embark on the second phase of this initiative, known as the Aha! Program that builds on the gains from the sensitization process as it attempts to encourage ordinary citizens and collectivities to actively report governmental wrongdoing.

Procurement Reform: Curbing the Culture of Wheeling and Dealing
One of the main sources of corruption in the Philippines comprises anomalies dealing with the procurement of the various things needed for government projects. Huge sums of money were allegedly embezzled by government officials from the topmost tiers of the government bureaucracy until its lower levels. Scholars have analyzed this practice using the framework of “rent-seeking” (Mendoza 2003, Hutchcroft 1991, de Dios and Ferrer 2001). The problem was indeed grave such that the Macapagal-Arroyo administration prioritized the passage of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act in the hope of instilling more transparency in the acquisition of government supplies and materials and in the employment of services. This law featured one major innovation: the requirement of two representatives from the private sector to sit as observers in the bids and awards committees of the government. Correspondingly, this was construed by civil society organizations as an opportunity to conduct informal oversight in government procurement activities.

One of the main advocates of that law is the main stalwart of the battle for a more open and public procurement process is Procurement Watch, Inc. (PWI). As stated in its goals and objectives:

PWI’s primary objective is to promote transparency and accountability, as well as to assist in the streamlining of procedures in government procurement of goods, supplies, materials, services and infrastructure projects. Through in-depth research, vigilant monitoring and uncompromising advocacy against graft and corruption, PWI sees its role as a prime mover in the battle for greater transparency and accountability in government procurement. (www.procurementwatch.org).

The PWI was able to strategically link with government given that it was invited in the procurement reform process since its nascent stage. Indeed, PWI was an indispensable actor in both in the formulation as well as implementation and monitoring of procurement reforms. It heavily campaigned and advocated for the adoption of RA 9184 and lent its technical expertise in the crafting of the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of the law. Moreover, it sought the help of other anti-corruption civil society organizations in order to build a coalition for the reform of the government procurement process. This includes tapping into powerful actors such as the Catholic Church and media to help build national awareness regarding the issue.

But PWI realizes that an NGO’s work is never done as that the adoption of the law is merely the starting phase of the procurement reform process. Taking full advantage of its technical competence and knowledge learned throughout the years, it has shifted its focus in training other NGOs, civic associations, people’s organizations, and other members of the voluntary sector regarding the procurement process. It main objective is more to transfer the skills and learning to other actors across the country in order to ensure transparency in government procurement. Likewise, it has a very tight working relationship with the OMB from the conduction of training sessions on the Government Procurement Reform Act for its officials to the institution of the “Feedback and Complaint-handling Mechanism” to process and respond to reports and other information provided by procurement observers. This independent and private whistle blowing mechanism ensures that complaints will be heard and filtered by the PWI and then referred to the OMB for appropriate action. As an intermediate link between citizens and the government, PWI could ensure the faithful handling of grievances and complaints regarding possible anomalies. Another joint venture between the PWI and the OMB is to tap college students to be volunteer observers and monitors of with contract bid and award activities of government as part of their community service requirement. Not only would this initiative assure the steady inflow of informed citizens regarding the public procurement process, it is also optimistic that this experience would instill a sense of volunteerism and graft intolerance to the Filipino youth (Marcelo 2005)

In addition, PWI maintains to embody the “social watchdog” role as it continues to monitor and assess how various government institutions – from the health and agriculture department to the national defense, public works, and education agencies – have faithfully complied with the improved procurement process. It remains observant on how these agencies conduct their biddings ready to sound off “alarms” if the need arises. It also stockpiles best practices among publish them as technical reports ready for public dissemination. Lastly, its attention is also directed at the implementation of new procurement reforms using the power of the Internet. As government incrementally adopts e-procurement procedures, PWI will continue seeking to be at the forefront of the proper development and implementation of e-procurement in the Philippines through clear and well-defined policies and guidelines.

PWI shares the limelight as far as government procurement is concerned with the GWatch (Government Watch) Program. Formed by the Ateneo School of Government (ASG) this is an independent monitoring project that undertakes research and advocacy on themes related to governance and public management, specifically the contract implementation side of government procurement. Among its initial endeavors is the so-called “Textbook Count” in 2003 that intended to keep an eye on the proper deliveries of textbooks purchased by the Department of Education (DepEd). The context for this action are the persistent reports that alleged irregularities have occurred such as the over-pricing, unqualified bidders, ghost-deliveries or long delays in the deliveries, and substandard quality of the textbooks (Luz 2004; Chua 1999). Faced with these problems, the DepEd also had the acknowledgment that it needed civil society intervention in the three main phases of the count: as monitors in the bidding process, quality control inspection, and actual deliveries (Leung 2005).

Given that it is a nationwide project, GWatch faced a difficulty of acquiring the necessary resources (human, financial, and technical) to actually implement the count in about 5,500 delivery points across the country. This was addressed in the aggressive coalition-building efforts of the GWatch inviting other civil society formations while maintaining to be its national coordinator. Among its eventual partners was the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) that suited the needs of the count given its vast experience in electoral monitoring and extensive spread of volunteers nationwide. It assisted in the actual deliveries of the textbooks at the district level (Luz 2004; Leung 2005: 3-4).

At the start of 2004, the second year of the project, GWatch sough the inclusion of more organizations. It cannot solicit the support of Namfrel anymore given that its attention was on the preparations for the upcoming elections during that time. However, it was able to discover a gold mine by tapping into the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) and the Girl Scouts of the Philippines (GSP) to take the lead in the volunteer mobilization of the actual deliveries for the count for a myriad of reasons (Marcelo 2005). One, there is virtually a BSP and GSP chapter in every school in the country thereby solving the manpower deficit of the program. Second, both possessed an impressive organizational and territorial structure that enabled the project to coordinate all activities and report successful deliveries or possible anomalies with relative ease. Third, there is a unique symbolic impact of having young children tasked to monitor the execution of government project whether it creates a deterrent effect or inculcates a sense of civic consciousness, and social responsibility among the children. Together with other civil society actors, each monitoring team must accomplish an Inspection and Acceptance Receipt that not only is proof of the delivery of textbooks in the proper time and in good condition, this mandatory document also related the various observations regarding the exercise.

In the end, the project was able to produce moderate but encouraging results. According to official DepEd reports, the average cost of a textbook was reduced as much as 39% because of more transparent procurement procedures. Besides this, the time spent for the entire process was significantly trimmed down by half from the original 24 month cycle. Aside from these specific advances, Leung perceptively observed that there were changed as far as the mindset of the actors is concerned as they were able to “clarify their roles, renew their commitments and respect their relationships with one another” (2005: 9). This is not to mention the general change of the public perception about the inspiring volunteerism of organized citizens, the accommodation of the government to the constructive involvement of civil society, and reform-orientation of the DepEd.

From Protest to Participation: Accountability Reform and Civil Society in the Philippines - Part 3

Performance of Public Institutions: Providing Oversight and Voice
At the initial level, global best practices on curbing corruption suggest that a fundamental aspect of accountability reform is the appointment of the appropriate personnel that have a reputation for probity, independence, honesty and integrity (Diamond 2002). Given that civil society organizations are well aware of this fact, they have always been at the forefront in campaigning for the increased transparency and inclusion of any process of appointment to accountability institutions, even if existing regulations fell silent on this matter.

Such has been the initiative of the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN). Being well aware of the importance of the OMB as the lead institution in the country’s accountability regime and the corresponding problems it confronts, TAN launched a transparency campaign in the selection process of the Philippine Ombudsman in 2002. While both the country’s Constitution and the enabling law that created the OMB did not have any provision for a transparent nomination process, the coalition sought to propose an amendment to the rules that govern the JBC to make all of its deliberations open to the public. TAN found a likely ally among the members of the JBC to sponsor their proposal such that it was able to successfully find its way into its amended rules stating that all of its interviews for prospective nominees to all positions within its jurisdiction shall be announced in the media and the public is invited to listen.

More than trying to create an impact to the public institution concerned, TAN’s crusade for transparency also strived for greater public awareness about the OMB and its crucial role in promoting accountable governance through a series of public forums and media campaigns. While the coalition intentionally did not opt to endorse a specific candidate, it actively “lobbied to make sure that only persons of integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards will be recommended for appointment (TAN 2002). Whether it was only coincidental or a product of the TAN’s campaign for the transparent selection of the OMB, the appointed ombudsman had both a sense of the institutional problems and inadequacies the institution were facing, as well as the humble appreciation of the importance of collaborating with civil society (Marcelo 2005).

This was validated by TAN member organizations as they openly admit that a partnership with the ombudsman has been meaningful, fruitful, and genuine as he sought to embark on the reform of the OMB that would surely required the participation of civil society organizations. Given that TAN is considered as the “anti-corruption hub”, an umbrella coalition of various organizations from all social sectors to coordinate all initiatives and activities geared towards accountability, it was able to develop a strategic partnership with the OMB in various reform thrusts. One of them is the conduct of several workshops in 31 national government offices in 2002-2003 whose objective is to help these agencies in crafting their own “anti-corruption plans by identifying corruption vulnerabilities and formulating strategic measures to address these vulnerabilities” (Marcelo 2005). An initiative that also included PAGC, these workshops culminated in the generation of Corruption Prevention Reform Program (CPRP) for ten (10) critical agencies. Following the model of an “integrity pact”, it is an exercise in self-reflexivity as the agencies themselves assess their transparency and accountability conditions and problems and the corresponding solutions to help fight graft and corruption. It overcomes the usual approach of government in “policing itself” by allowing the agencies concerned to design the reform program themselves given that they in a more effective position to have an informed assessment. However, TAN regularly monitors the status of the CPRP and scrutinizes whether the concerned agencies of government are fulfilling their promises to themselves.

One of the innovative government-led programs to address graft and corruption is the so-called Lifestyle Check program launched in 2002. It is based on the belief that “one’s quality of life, level of affluence and lifestyle, reveals greatly one’s financial capacity or standing (Marcelo 2005). Following that a government official is not relatively given high financial compensation (vis-à-vis those working in the profit sector), the indication of any incongruity in terms of the corresponding lifestyle of that particular public servant and/or his/her family deserves government scrutiny and attention from accountability institutions. This may require the particular official to be made answerable either to explain or justify his/her manner of living.

Specifically, the lifestyle check is conducted by probing into the assets declarations of government officials and explores indications of extravagant living that might be inconsistent with their financial net worth or remuneration as government officials. Asides from scrutinizing their asset value or net worth, other probe areas take into account behavioral aspects such as leisure habits, kin checks – looking at relatives who could have gained employment through the official’s influence, and conflicts of interest (Quimson 2004: 238). President Macapagal-Arroyo mandated the PAGC to be the lead implementer of this program with the OMB as the enforcer of findings and recommendations.

Cognizant of the vital function of civil society in any anti-corruption program, PAGC sought its inclusion in the Lifestyle Check Coalition, an aggrupation of state agencies and societal organizations such as TAN and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed on March 2003 that formally launched the partnership. The coalition has organized various capability-building seminars and workshops for both government personnel and the civil society actors. Several task forces were formed to divide the labor with civil society groups mainly performing the role of providing information on possible candidates for a lifestyle check.

The conduct of lifestyle check was done with reactive ease given the existing requirements for all government officials to declare their annual net worth in a public document known as the Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL). This requisite of full disclosure has implications for any undeclared wealth or astounding increases in one’s assets. Any public servant that violates this mandatory duty is liable to existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Government was very eager to declare the success of the program despite being barely 4 years old. No less than the Chief Executive proclaimed that the lifestyle check is a “lethal weapon” in her 2004 State of the Nation Address. A total of 159 lifestyle checks have been conducted (de Guzman 2004). These resulted in the filing of over a one hundred (100) cases by PAGC and the OMB. For example, the OMB concentrated its attention towards the three most corrupt agencies based on public perception – Internal Revenue Bureau, of Customs Bureau, and the Public Works and Highways Department. This “strategic agency targeting” had a modicum of success, as it was able to effectively and frequently uncover illegally acquired wealth of several officials. This led to their immediate prosecution and dismissal from office. It has already been noticed by the World Bank (WB) when it stated “[w]hen carefully researched and documented, such independent asset checks can help enhance integrity” (Marcelo 2004; 2005: 13).

But some would rather reserve their accolades to this program as soon as government is able to exact accountability from some of the “big fishes”. As Quimson astutely observed,

Firstly, there is a risk that lifestyle checks may develop into witch-hunts by department heads against their personnel, possibly as foils to throw investigators off their own scents, or by lower-ranking personnel as weapons against their superiors. Rivalries may become motives for accusations, with the risk of harassment. Secondly, lifestyle checks sometimes conflict with confidentiality and privacy concerns, and civil rights problems may arise over the ‘entrapment procedures’ recently proposed by the ombudsman’s Special Prosecutor’s Office. Thirdly, though lifestyle checks are certainly useful against small-time offenders, they may intensify capital flight and money laundering abroad, making the exposure of high-ranking officials more difficult (2004: 238-239).

It is in this context that civil society might enter to possibly ameliorate the existing limitations of the lifestyle check. According to TAN, they are gearing towards a more proactive role in this program and not simply becoming information providers. This implies being involved in the prosecution stages such as case build-up efforts. While they are in close coordination with the agencies authorized to conduct these checks, they would remain their critical distance and maintain to be the “guardians of the guardians”.

Diagnostics: Measuring Corruption and Tracking Reform Initiatives
Business groups, and civil society groups through the assistance provided by international funding agencies have long ventured into coming up with diagnostic assessments on accountability-related issues such as the public perception on graft and corruption, the sincerity and capacity of government agencies to curb wrongdoing, and the other opinion-related concerns. This paper has already made use of the results of the SWS Survey of Enterprises from 2001-2005 which would not have been possible without the help of the Makati Business Club (MBC) and the Asia Foundation. But there are other initiatives as well.

One such example has been the input provided by academic institutions like the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP). It is currently the proponent of the Integrity Development Review (IDR) program, a diagnostic tool to assess graft and corruption as well as to evaluate reform efforts. It is considered a unique exercise, as it is “an in-depth and comprehensive management systems audit that aims to provide diagnostic tools that will assist government agencies in assessing their systems integrity and in mapping out their corruption vulnerabilities”. This objective diagnostic tool has been pilot-tested to the OMB itself at the early part of this year as the outcomes have been very encouraging. According to Marcelo, the IDR program in the OMB generated a list of reforms that included its own specialized and stricter Code of Conduct; stricter internal policies, prohibitions, procedures and requirements of disclosures as to receipt of gifts and benefits by its officials and employees; and policies, rules and procedures on whistle-blowing, internal reporting and investigation (2005: 11). It is the hope of OMB that this list would be successfully implemented effectively in the future that in turn will generate more IDRs that would be conducted in other government agencies.

Policy Advocacy
In an arena where Philippine civil society has shown tremendous influence, policy advocacy for more accountability in governance have yet to be fully embraced by most civil society groups in general. Asides from the vital role of PWI in the enactment of law on procurement reform, most of the legislative measures that societal actors have remained dormant in the country’s legislative mill. For example, TAN has formulated various bills that would seek to comprehensively restructure and overhaul the country’s internal revenue collection agency for they believe that it is futile to continue to reform an institution whose corruption has “metastasized”. In addition, they have also been at the forefront to lobby for a law that specifically provides for freedom of access to information in order to encourage greater transparency and eliminate possible obstacles to the disclosure of government actions and decisions.

However, Quimson (2004) discerned that the country presently has a crucial gap in its accountability regime. There are no laws that protect whistleblowers which have far reaching repercussions for societal watchdogs. If there is no protection afforded by the state to brave individuals or groups that are willing to divulge and expose official misconduct, it would compromise a mechanism of accountability given the absence or lack of reliable and genuine information backed by concrete evidence.


Conclusions

This paper has demonstrated that the power of contention and protest as a mode of civil society engagement could be transformed into a direct mode of influencing and even implementing accountability reform. The Philippine experience showed that any success in addressing its accountability deficit would entail a strategic partnership between government and civil society actors.

The various cases of civil society participation have imparted a set of lessons and best practices. First, the presence of reform-minded leaders in anti-graft government institutions is imperative for accountability reform to be plausible. While the appointment of these progressive individuals is mostly a prerogative of the Chief Executive, this paper has shown that the civil society was able to influence the process of selection by campaigning for greater inclusion and transparency. The political leadership must be made aware that the chosen “guardians” must have the necessary qualifications – competence, integrity, and independence – in order to infuse that there is sincerity on the part of the government to impose restraint upon itself. If government is able to provide willing and able officials, it would not be difficult for civil society to actively involve itself and forge partnerships.

However, there is one caveat must be pointed out. The chose leaders that will implement accountability reform must be “institution builders” that will institutionalize mechanism and good practices in curbing corruption. They must ensure that best practices and mechanisms routinized as accepted as policy. These leaders must make it very difficult for predecessors to jeopardize, overturn, and dismiss existing rules, procedure, and programs that enforce accountable governance in the country.

Second, while most of these cases have been anecdotal, there is the challenge of “scaling-up” meaning both the vertical and horizontal diffusion of these efforts across the country. The remarkable achievements of CCAGG, the Textbook Count, and the Ehem! Program, albeit inspiring, must be replicated across the country in order to genuinely reap the benefits of improved accountability. These examples have only shown the range of possibilities with regard to curbing corruption that hopefully could be utilized by other civil society actors in cooperation with their relevant government agencies may it be their local governments, regional offices of state departments, etc. While this paper has limited itself to one face of corruption, it is likewise urgent to turn attention to its other manifestations. The allegations of fraud against the incumbent administration only showed that the country’s electoral process is in dire need of reform. Any positive changes in the enforcement horizontal accountability will be futile unless a country’s electoral exercises are not considered free, fair, clean, and honest given that it remains as the quintessential source of democratic accountability. Moreover, the civil society also would need to look at corporate corruption. Again, the country’s dismal fiscal situation only points to the inability of the state to properly generate revenues. There is a consensus that the one of the main causes of the low tax effort of the Philippines is the rampant and endemic corruption that exists between government officials and the business sector.

Third, any civil society initiative would not be successful without sufficient and sustainable pool of resources – whether human, financial, and technical. This paper has revealed that most, if not all, of the programs have received tremendous assistance from international and multilateral funding agencies. Civil society leaders foresee the needed for such funding and support to be sustainable. Thus, it becomes a survival issue for civil society initiatives to diversify the origin of their resources. It was a positive sign that most business entrepreneurs are willing to personally participate and even to give a small percentage of their profit to help anti-corruption efforts (SWS 2005). Another related point is the lack of organizations willing to involve themselves in accountability reform. But this may not be easy given that other NGOs or civil society groups would have to balance this with their other advocacies or issues. Moreover, there is the potential of resources being offered by what is known as “diaspora philanthropy” – given the substantial number of overseas Filipino citizens. This pool of resources – whether financial or technical – is a great reservoir that the government and civil society organization could tap.

Fourth, the media could immensely contribute to accountability reform by helping disseminate the successful initiatives of the civil society and help expose official misconduct and government wrongdoing. However, it is it is not just media per se that is needed but a critical type more known as “watchdog” journalism – one that scrutinizes the activities and behavior of public officials guided by the protection and promotion of the public interest and the pursuit of transparency and accountability in governance.

Last, any attempt to forge state-civil society relationships should be treated with sensitivity and caution. There should be mutual respect on the independence of the two spheres and an agreement on the roles that civil society would play in such partnerships. Furthermore, the government must have the sensitivity to determine whom among civil society actors to engage with regard to governance and policy processes. It must ensure that such entities have sufficient credibility and enjoy the support and confidence of the public sphere.

Earlier versions of this article were presented by Aries A. Arugay at the 4th International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) Asia Pacific Regional Conference held in Bangalore, India from 16-18 November 2005 and the World Ethics Forum held in Oxford University, United Kingdom from 9-12 April 2006.

References

Alejo, Albert, et al. 2003. Ehem! A Manual for Deepening Involvement in Combating Corruption. Quezon City: Philippine Province of the Society of Jesus.
Araya, Alfred. 2003. “Jesuits Take on Corruption.” www.cyberdyaro.com. 24 July.
Arroyo, Dennis. 2004. “Summary Paper on the Stocktaking of Social Accountability Initiatives in Asia and the Pacific.” Paper written for the World Bank Institute Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Learning Program.
Arugay, Aries A. 2004. “The Politics of Societal Accountability in the Philippines: A Study of the Issues, Actors, and Strategies in the Resignation, Impeachment, and Ouster (RIO) Campaign against Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.” Unpublished MA Thesis, University of the Philippines.
Arugay, Aries A. 2005. “The Accountability Deficit in the Philippines: Implications and Prospects for Democratic Consolidation.” Philippine Political Science Journal 26(49): 62-88.
Batalla, Eric, Fernando Aldaba, Filomen Sta. Ana, and Nepo Malaluan. 2001. “Governance and Corruption in the Philippines.” Unpublished manuscript.
Behn, Robert. 1998. “The New Public Management Paradigm and the Search for Democratic Accountability.” International Public Management Journal 1(2): 131-165.
Caagusan, Flor, Ed. 2005. Policy Advocacy: Experiences and Lessons from the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
Cariño, Ledivina. 1983. “Administrative Accountability: A Review of the Evolution, Meaning and Operationalization of a Key Concept in Public Administration.” Philippine Journal of Public Administration 27(2).
Cariño, Ledivina, Ed. 2002. Between the State and the Market: The Nonprofit Sector and Civil Society in the Philippines. Quezon City: Center for Leadership, Citizenship, and Democracy.
Chua, Yvonne. 1999. Robbed: An Investigation of Corruption in Philippine Education. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.
Clarke, Gerard. 2000. The Politics of NGOs in Southeast Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines. London: Routledge.
Constantino-David, Karina. 1998. “From the Present Looking Back: A History of Philippine NGOs.” in G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble, Eds. Organizing for Democracy: NGOs, Civil Society, and the Philippine State. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
De Dios, Emmanuel and Ricardo Ferrer. 2001. “Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and Context.” Public Policy 5(1): 1-42.
De Guzman, Constancia. 2004. “Renewed Campaign Against Corruption.” Presentation made at the Combating Corruption Conference of the Coalition against Corruption, Manila, 21 September.
Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Horizontal Accountability and Corruption Control.” Paper presented at the conference “Economic Reform and Good Governance: Fighting Corruption in Transition Economies.” Beijing, April 2002.
Eaton. Kent. 2003. “Restoration or Transformation? Trapos vs. NGOs in the Democratization of the Philippines.” Journal of Asian Studies 62(2): 469-496.
Fackler, Tim and Tse-mim Lin. 1995. “Political Corruption and Presidential Elections, 1929-1992.” Journal of Politics 57(4): 971-993.
Fox, Jonathan. 2000. “Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion.” Paper presented at the conference titled “Institutions, Accountability, and Democratic Governance in Latin America,” Indiana.
Gonzalez, Eduardo and Magdalena Mendoza. 2004. “Anticorruption Initiatives in the Philippines: Breakthroughs, Limits, and Challenges.” In Vinay Bhargava and Emil Bolongaita, Eds. Challenging Corruption in Asia: Case Studies and Framework for Action. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Hutchcroft, Paul. 1991. “Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder.” World Politics 43: 414-450.
Leung, Grace. 2005. “Textbook Count and Civil Society Participation” Effective System Reforms in the Department of Education.” Unpublished manuscript submitted to GWatch, Ateneo School of Government.
Luckham, Robin, Anne Marie Goetz, and Mary Kaldor. 2003. “Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics.” In Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham, Eds. Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies. London: Zed Books.
Luz, Juan Miguel. 2004. “National Textbook Delivery Program (Textbook Count).” Presentation made at the Combating Corruption Conference of the Coalition against Corruption, Manila, 21 September.
Magadia, Jose. 2003. State-Society Dynamics: Policy Making in a Restored Democracy. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Marcelo, Simeon. 2005. “OMB Anti-Corruption Reforms and Strategies.” Paper Presented before the Harvard Law School Alumni Association of the Philippines, Makati City, Philippines. www.ombudsman.gov.ph.
Marcelo, Simeon. 2004. “OMB’s Briefing Paper on its Anti-Corruption Program.” Presentation made at the Combating Corruption Conference of the Coalition against Corruption, Manila, 21 September.
Mendoza, Amado Jr. 2001. “The Industrial Anatomy of Corruption: Government Procurement, Bidding and Awards of Contract.” Public Policy 5(1): 43-67.
Newell, Peter and Shaula Bellour. 2002. “Mapping Accountability: Origins, Contexts, and Implications for Development.” Working Paper No. 168. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 2005. “About Various ‘Accountabilities’ and Their Relationships.” In Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, Eds. Enforcing the Rule of Law: The Politics of Societal Accountabiliy in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 2004. “Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization of Mistrust.” In Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, Eds. Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Political Institutions in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” In Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (eds.). The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Peruzzotti, Enrique and Catalina Smulovitz. 2005. “Social Accountability: The Other Side of Control.” In Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, Eds. Enforcing the Rule of Law: The Politics of Social Accountability in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Pope, Jeremy, Ed. 1996. National Integrity Systems: The TI Source Book. Berlin: Transparency International.
Quimson, Gabriella. 2004. “Philippines.” In Global Corruption Report 2004. Berlin: Transparency International.
Racelis, Mary. 2000. “New Visions and Strong Actions: Civil Society in the Philippines.” In Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, Eds. Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Ramkumar, Vivek and Warren Krafchik. 2005. “The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Auditing and Public Finance Management.” The International Budget Project. www.internationalbudget.org/SAIs.pdf.
Schedler, Andreas. 1999. “Conceptualizing Accountability.” In Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, Eds. The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sklar, Richard. 1987. “Developmental Democracy.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29(4): 686-714.
Smulovitz, Catalina and Enrique Peruzzotti. 2000. “Societal Accountability in Latin America.” Journal of Democracy 11(4): 147-158.
Social Weather Stations (SWS) 2005. The 2005 SWS Survey of Enterprises on Corruption. Quezon City: SWS.
Sumangil, Pura. 2004. “Citizens’ Action: Monitoring Public Works Projects.” Presentation made at the Combating Corruption Conference of the Coalition against Corruption, Manila, 21 September. www.i-site.ph/Focus/CCAGG.ppt.
Transparency and Accountability Network. 2002. “Walking Through the Office of the Ombudsman: Defining the Job and the OMB Selection Process 2002.” Makati City: TAN.
Transparency International (TI). 2002. Corruption Fighter’s Tool Kit: Civil Society Experiences and Emerging Strategies. Berlin: TI.
Transparency International (TI). 2004. Global Corruption Report. Berlin: TI.
Transparency International (TI). 2000. “Transparency International Integrity Award Winners.” www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2000/2000.09.28.i_award_portraits.html.
World Bank. 1994. Governance: The World Bank’s Experience. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 1992. Governance and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wui, Marlon A. and Ma. Glenda S. Lopez, Eds. 1998. State-Civil Society Relations in Policy-Making. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center.